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Torts
Torts; punitive damages for wrongful death
Civil Code §3294 (amended).
AB 444 (Clute); 1983 STAT. Ch 408
Support: Attorney General; Crime Victim Restitution Package
Opposition: State Farm Insurance Company
Since 1874, California plaintiffs have been burdened with the anomaly
that punitive damages' can be awarded to the representative of a dece-
dent's estate in an action under a survival statute,2 but not to a plaintiff in
a wrongful death action Chapter 408 expands the ability of survivors of
homicide victims to obtain punitive damages from convicted criminals.4
Punitive damages are now recoverable in a wrongful death action when
the death resulted from a homicide for which the defendant has been con-
victed of a felony.' Punitive damages, therefore, are available whether the
decedent died instantly, or survived the fatal injury for a period of time.6
Finally, Chapter 408 provides that joinder7 and consolidation' will be
used to avoid multiple recoveries of punitive damages for the same wrong-
ful act.9
1. CAL. CIV. CODE §3294 (definition of exemplary or punitive damages); see also
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910,928,582 P.2d 980,990, 148 Cal. Rptr.
389,399 (1978) (listing the factors considered in determining whether, and in what amount,
punitive damages should be awarded).
2. See CAL. PROB. CODE §573.
3. See 1874 Cal. Stat. c. 383, §40, at 294 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377);
Lange v. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388, 391, 47 P. 139, 139 (1896) (stating that the purpose of the
1874 amendment to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377 was to take away the right to exemplary
damages in wrongful death actions); seealso Pease v. BeechAircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d
450, 461, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 423 (1974). This differentiation was held not to violate the
equal protection clause of the California Constitution, as the plaintiffs in a wrongful death
action assert a statutory right to recover on their own behalf for harm which was done to an-
other. Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Ct. of State of California, 120 Cal. App. 3d 748, 751, 175
Cal. Rptr. 39,41 (1981). See generally McClelland & Truett, Survival ofPunitive Damages in
WrongfulDeath Cases, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 585 (1974).
4. Compare CAL. CIv. CODE §3294 with 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 174, §l, at 816 (amending
CAL. CIV. CODE §3294). SEE RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO SURVIVAL
ACTIONs, 3 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N REPORTS F-6 (1961).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(d).
6. Id.
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §427.10 (definition ofjoinder).
8. Id. § 104 (definition of consolidation).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(d); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377 (procedures for use
ofjoinder and consolidation). Chapter 408 is part of the Crime Victim Restitution Program
of 1983. 1983 Cal. Stat. c. 408, §2, at (amending CAL. CIV. CODE §3294).
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Torts; firearms and ammunition
Civil Code § 1714.4 (new).
AB 75 (McAlister); 1983 STAT. Ch 1299
Support: California Rifle and Pistol Association; National Rifle Asso-
ciation
Opposition: Califonia Trial Lawyers Association
Existing law imposes tort liability for willful acts and injuries caused by
want of ordinary care or skill. 1 The application of proximate cause, how-
ever, is limited in specified situations.2 Chapter 1299 specifically ad-
dresses proximate cause in products liability actions involving firearms
and ammunition.
The California Supreme Court, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,4 for-
mulated a two-pronged test to determine whether a product design is de-
fective,5 creating strict liability for the suppliers of the product.6 Under
Barker, a product is defective in design if the plaintiff (1) establishes that
the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would ex-
pect when used in an intended or reasonably forseeable manner, or (2)
demonstrates that the design of the product proximately caused the plain-
tiffs injury, and the defendant fails to establish that the benefits of the de-
sign outweigh the risks inherent in that same design.7
Chapter 1299 limits the application of the Barker test in cases involving
firearms and ammunition.8 Specifically, Chapter 1299 provides that fire-
arms or ammunition cannot be deemed defective in design based on the
contention that the benefits of the products do not outweigh the risks of
injury that the products create.9 In addition, a firearm or ammunition is
not made defective in design by the possibility of serious injury, damage,
or death resulting upon discharge.10
Pursuant to Chapter 1299, injuries or damages resulting from the dis-
charge of a firearm or ammunition are not proximately caused by thepo-
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a).
2. Id. § 1714(b),(c). For example, furnishing alcoholic beverages by a social host to
an intoxicated person is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication. Id.
3. Seeid. §1714.4.
4. 20 Cal. 3d 413,573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
5. See id. at 432,573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.4; see also 20 Cal. 3d at 432,573 P.2d at 455,143 Cal.
Rptr. at 237 (to compare the language of Barker with the legislative language).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(a).
10. Id. §1714.4(b)(1).
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tentialof the product to cause serious injury, damage, or death."' Damages
resulting from the actual discharge of a firearm or ammunition, however,
are proximately caused.'2 Finally, these provisions do not affect a product
liability cause of action based upon the improper selection of design alter-
natives. 13
11. Id. § 1714.4(b)(2).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 1714.4(c).
Torts; immunity from defamation for anonymous witness
programs
Civil Code §48.9 (new).
SB 331 (Presley); 1983 STAT. Ch 495
Support: Associated General Contractors of California; Attorney
General; Construction Industry Crime Prevention Program
Existing law allows a person falsely accused of a crime to sue for slan-
der' or libel.2 Defendants in these actions, however, are immune from lia-
bility if the accusations were made in a judicial proceeding or any other
official proceeding authorized by law.' Chapter 495 grants a similar im-
munity to organizations sponsoring or conducting an anonymous witness
program. These organizations and their employees are not liable for
damages resulting from the receipt of information of possible criminal ac-
tivity or the dissemination of that information to a law enforcement
agency.' This protection applies to actions commenced by the person ac-
cused of the wrongdoing, or by an informant who suffered retaliatory
damages as a result of supplying the information. 6 The organizations are
not shielded from liability, however, when (1) the organization dissemi-
1. CAL. CIV. CODE §46 (definition of slander); see, e.g., Kelly v. General Tele-
phone Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278,285, 186 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187(1982) (accusation of forgery
was slander per se).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §§45, 45a (definition of libel). "It is well settled that if alleged
defamatory words are reasonably calculated to induce readers thereof to believe that a per-
son is guilty of a criminal offense and the words are false, they are sufficient to support an
action for libel." Gallagherv. Chavalas, 48 Cal. App. 2d 52, 59,119 P.2d 408, 412 (1941).
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE §47(2). "[A] communication concerning possible wrong-
doing, made to an official government agency such as a local police department, and which
communication is designed to prompt action by that entity, is as much a part of an 'official
proceeding' as a communication made after an officialinvestigation has commenced." Wil-
lianis v. Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 3d 745,753, 181 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427-28 (1982).
4. See CAL. CIV. CODE §48.9(d) (definition of anonymous witness program).
5. Id. §48.9(a).
6. Id. §48.9(b).
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nated the information knowing it was false,' (2) an informant's name was
disseminated without the informant's authorization and the dissemina-
tion was not required by law,8 or (3) the organization obtained the inform-
ant's name, but did not tell the informant that disclosure of the
informant's name may be required by law.
9
7. Id. §48.9(c)(1).
8. Id. §48.9(c)(2).
9. Id. §48.9(c)(3).
Torts; vandalism
Civil Code § 1721 (new).
SB 561 (Robbins); 1983 STAT. Ch 474.
Support: California Associated Builders and Contractors; California
Peace Officers Association; Peace Officers Research Association of
California
An interference with another's real or personal property' (hereinafter
referred to as property) is actionable in the civil courts as conversion2 or
trespass.3 A successful plaintiff in a conversion action may recover the full
value of the property.4 If the suit is one for trespass, however, the amount
of recoverable damages may equal only the actual damage suffered.' Ad-
ditionally, the malicious destruction of property is criminally punishable
as vandalism.6 Upon a conviction for vandalism, the defendant is guilty of
a misdemeanor if the damage is under $ 1,000,1 or a felony-misdemeanor if
the damage is equal to or exceeds $1,000.8
Chapter 474 increases the amount of damages recoverable when spe-
cific types of property are destroyed.9 In a civil action for intentional and
malicious destruction of property at a site where substantial improve-
1. See W. L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 63-97 (4th Ed.) (discussion of inten-
tional interference with property). The definition of interference includes the destruction
or alteration of another's property. Id. at 91-92.
2. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 80-81; Igauye v. Howard 114 Cal. App. 2d 122,
126,249 P.2d 558,561 (1952); Milerv. Rau, 216 Cal. App. 2d 68,75,30 Cal. Rptr. 612,616
(1963) (definition of conversion).
3. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 28; Brennerv. Haley, 185 Cal. App. 2d 183, 187, 8
Cal. Rptr. 224, 227 (1960) (definition of trespass); see also PROSSER, supra note 1, at 63-79(discussion of what constitutes trespass).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE §3336.
5. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 67; Herzogv. Grosso, 41 Cal. 2d 219, 225, 259 P.2d
429,433-34(1953).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §594(a).
7. Id. §594(b)(2).
8. Id. §§594(b)(1) 1203.4(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3).
9. Compare id. §594 with CAL. CIV. CODE §1721.
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ments are under construction, a successful plaintiff may be entitled to
damages equal to three times the amount of actual damages suffered, and
reasonable attorney's fees.' ° The amount of damages awarded is discre-
tionary with the court."
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §1721.
11. Id
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